Ahwaz
Arabs of Ahwaz
The Revolt of Arab Iranians


The following article was written by the Iranian journalist Amir Taheri and appeared in Arab News.

Is the Islamic Republic of Iran facing a growing revolt by its Arab minority?

Until a couple of years ago, the question would have sounded naive or provocative. In the 1980s, Arab-Iranians had fought bravely against Saddam Hussein's forces despite the fact that they were linked to the invading Iraqis by ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious ties going back 1300 years.

According to data from the Foundation for the Martyrs, an organization supposed to look after war veterans and the families of the war dead, the number of Arab-Iranians who died for the fatherland was proportionally four times higher than Iranians from other ethnic backgrounds. And, yet, in the past two years evidence has mounted that Arab-Iranians, disenchanted by the Islamic republic and angry at Tehran's increasingly repressive policies under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are drawn toward dissidence and revolt.

Last year, rising tension in a number of Khuzestani towns and villages forced Ahamdinejad to cancel his much-publicized visit to the province. (Later, he managed a shortened version of the trip amid tight security.)

In the past few weeks, the authorities have executed 11 men in connection with the nascent Arab revolt. Hundreds more have been arrested and shipped to jails in unknown destinations. Earlier this month, bands of Arab youths ran riot in the streets of Ahvaz, capital of the southwestern province of Khuzestan, attacking government offices and banks and setting official cars on fire. According to eyewitnesses, the authorities had to bring in special Baseej (Mobilization) militia units to regain control. The pro-government militia later raided a number of neighborhoods, including Khazaalyiah and Kut-Abdallah, where ethnic Arabs form a majority, arresting dozens of people. Among them was Thamer Ahvazi, regarded as one of the province's top musical pop stars. His crime? Singing "defiant" rap-style songs in Arabic.

There are no accurate figures regarding the number of ethnic Arabs in Iran. The best estimates, however, put the number at around 2.2 million, or more than three percent of the total population. They are stretched over 600 kilometers of territory, from the borders of Iraq to the Straits of Hormuz on the Gulf of Oman. More than half, however, live in Khuzestan, Iran's oil-rich province that also produces a good part of the nation's food, including almost all of its sugarcane and 80 percent of its date crops.

Until the late 1940s, ethnic Arabs were in majority in Ahvaz, the provincial capital and Khorrmashahr, the nation's biggest port until its destruction by Saddam Hussein in 1981.

Now, however, ethnic Arabs account for less than 25 percent of the population in Ahvaz, and just some 40 percent in Khorramshahr. Nevertheless, ethnic Arabs still form a majority in smaller towns along the border with Iraq, including Shadegan, Howeyzeh, Karkheh, and Dasht-Mishan. The population of the Iranian portion of the Mesopotamian marshlands is also almost entirely Arab.

The province's mainly Arab feature changed for several reasons.

First, the discovery of oil in 1908 led to an economic boom that created new job opportunities that the locals could not fulfill. Hundreds of thousands of peoples from provinces in the Iranian heartland poured into Khuzestan, first as temporary laborers and then as permanent residents.

The second reason was a government policy, formulated in 1928, to "Persianize" Arab majority areas by bringing whole families of farmers from distant provinces, including Khorassan some 1000 miles away. The newcomers revived the province's moribund agriculture, introduced new crops and, as they prospered, multiplied faster than native Arabs who remained largely excluded from the new economy.

The introduction of the military draft also helped the change. Many ethnic Arabs decided to smuggle their male children to the Arab coast of the Gulf to avoid obligatory military service. Most never returned.

Sometimes whole families and clans emigrated to avoid the draft and taxation by an increasingly assertive central government in Tehran. At the same time, the better-educated ethnic Arabs moved north to settle in Tehran, the capital, and other major cities in the Iranian heartland where they gradually lost their Arab identity.

It is hard to identify the exact causes of the current tension in Khuzestan. One source of tension is the emergence in neighboring Iraq of a new government dominated by Arab Shiites. In the Islamic republic, however, not a single ethnic Arab is in any key government position. Many Arab Shiites try to live on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border without having lost their ancient bonds of blood and tradition. The Bani Kaab, the Bani Amer, the Bani Tamim and other smaller tribes have always moved and intermarried regardless of the border fixed in 1921 when the British crated the new Iraqi state out of three Ottoman provinces.

The dream of a unified Arab Shiite state, encompassing central and southern Iraq as well as the Iranian province of Khuzestan, which Arab nationalists call "Arabistan", appeals to many activists on both sides of the border. Not surprisingly, some local tribal chiefs and even Shiite mullahs are trying to use that dream to build a constituency for themselves.

Another source of the tension is the activities of a number of armed groups, some of which set up by Saddam Hussein in the 1970s as a means of exerting pressure on Tehran. These groups, often linked to armed smuggling networks operating in both Iran and Iraq, have been mainly responsible for attacks on border posts and police stations in a number of towns close to the border.

The main source of the tension, however, is the central government's policy of implicit discrimination against the Arab minority. This is especially manifest in state-owned corporations where non-Arabs have an automatic advantage in terms of job opportunities, grades and pay.

Arabs are also at a disadvantage when it comes to places in higher education. Entry into Iranian universities is through a tough set of examinations known as "konkour". Ethnic Arabs disadvantaged at the examination because they usually come from worst rated secondary schools, do not quite master the Persian, the language of the tests, and are unfamiliar with specific questions dealing with Persian culture and literature. As a result, an ethnic Arab's chance of getting into an Iranian university is 12 times lower than his compatriots from Tehran, Shiraz or Isfahan. Demands that at least 10 percent of places at local universities be reserved for ethic Arabs have been turned down by successive Islamic republic administrations in Tehran. Ahmadinejad regards positive discrimination as "un-Islamic".

One outlet for Arab-Iranian grievances is the so-called Khuzestan Welfare Party that calls for greater autonomy for the province within the Iranian state. Created in 1946, the party disappeared in the mid-1950s, to reappear in 2005. No one can gauge its strength. But it provides a moderate alternative to the radical Ahvaz Liberation Front (ALF) that has preached armed struggle since the 1970s.

The revolt of Arab-Iranians is in its early stages. There is, as yet, no evidence that it might degenerate into secessionism. Ahmadinejad's repressive policies, however, could help those who claim that ethnic Arabs would be better off in a secular democratic state with their Iraqi Shiite Arab brethren than remaining within an Islamic republic dominated by chauvinistic mullahs.

The outside world should pay attention to what is happening in Khuzestan if only because it produces almost 70 percent of the oil that Iran exports each day.

Voice of America: Iran's Fifth Column


This article appeared on the Pajamas Media website

Are American taxpayers unwittingly funding the Iranian regime's own propaganda? Ali Ghaderi and Karim Abdian contend that US government-funded Voice of America Persia and Radio Farda are ultimately damaging to American interests. Not only do these broadcasting services have sympathy for the ruling theocracy, but their inherent Persian bias alienates Iranian ethnic and religious minorities.

Last month, Iran launched Press TV, an English-language television station to broadcast propaganda to the West, utilizing a network of loyal and well-paid correspondents across the world. But their task could have been made easier if they had simply translated broadcasts from the Voice of America Persian Service and Radio Farda, which are both funded by US taxpayers.

Millions of Congress-approved dollars are poured into the VOA-Persian Service and Radio Farda ostensibly to promote democracy and break the Iranian regime's overbearing censorship. However, they are facing increased scrutiny following damning reports by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma, the General Accountability Office (GAO), and the government's inter-agency Iran Steering Group. These reports condemned both VOA-Persian and Radio Farda for sympathy with sections of the Iranian regime and for often recycling the regime’s own propaganda. The situation is so bad that some Iranians in the US have begun to question whether the journalists employed by VOA-Persian and Radio Farda are agents for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence.

Some have also pointed to the inherent ethnic (Persian) chauvinism and cronyism in these broadcasts, which are alienating the non-Persian nationalities who are at least half, and by some estimates as high as two-thirds, of the total population in Iran. Activists representing a coalition of non-Persian parties campaigning for ethnic minority rights who monitor VOA Persian Service have released a study that shows that of the 132 people interviewed by VOA-Persian in May of 2007, just over two percent were from the ethnic minority groups of Kurds and Balochis. Thus, Ahwazi Arabs, Azeri-Turks, Turkmens, and others were completely excluded from these broadcasts despite the documented ongoing human rights violations against minorities by the Iranian regime.

These Farsi broadcasts (especially of VOA-Persian Service), claim Iranian minorities are controlled and managed by staunch supporters of the deposed Shah's son, Reza Pahlavi II, and share the regime's antipathy towards non-Persian ethnic groups. Reza Pahlavi and his senior advisors such as Shahriar Ahi and Draiush Homayoun are frequently—sometimes daily—featured on VOA-Persian TV.

The "guests" on these broadcasts are usually hand-picked Persian monarchists, ultra-nationalists or individuals with nationalist inclinations, who depict Iran as a Persian nation period, ignoring the claims of non-Persian Iranians who insist that Persians, despite their political dominance, are in a minority, and no more than a third of the total population. Most of the ultra-nationalists featured on VOA-Persian service believe and practice the ideology of Arian or Persian supremacy and don't believe that one can be Iranian and non-Persian at the same time.

In addition to these paid and unpaid guests who are consultants and senior advisers to Reza Pahlavi, former cabinet ministers and former diplomats of the Shah are also frequently featured on VOA-Persian TV. One was interviewed 15 times, and the rest multiple times in the single month of May alone. Aside from one Kurd and one Baloch, no members of the remaining non-Persian minorities were heard. US-funded radio and TV stations are targeting Persian monarchists, who represent an extreme minority in Iran.

Be it imperial or republican, Iran is clearly an ethnically diverse society, and ethnic dynamics have always been present throughout its history. Non-Persian ethnic groups are a major part, and play a dominant role in the current socio-political struggle for democratic transformation. The VOA broadcast should reflect this diversity. Under an ideal situation US government sponsored broadcasts should dare to be a platform for oppressed minorities and not a propaganda tool for the regime that portrays Iran as a Persian nation with no minority discontent.

Incredibly, VOA and Radio Farda refuse to broadcast news of human rights violations against ethnic and linguistic minorities, according to Iranian minority rights activists. Yet, according to Amnesty International, "Minorities are subject to discriminatory laws and practices," including restrictions on housing, the confiscation of land and property, denial of employment, and restrictions on cultural expression. This discrimination, AI adds, often results in "other human rights violations such as the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, grossly unfair trials of political prisoners before Revolutionary Courts, corporal punishment and use of the death penalty, as well as restrictions on movement and denial of other civil rights." Amnesty International's Iran desk has campaigned intensively for the release of prisoners of conscience campaigning for minority rights as well as an end to policies amounting to discrimination and persecution.

In November 2006, the European Parliament and the UN General Assembly also joined in the chorus of condemnation of the Iranian regime's discriminatory practices. In a rare display of unanimity, all the political groups in the European Parliament - from Conservatives to Communists — backed a resolution that condemned "the current disrespect of minority rights and demands that minorities be allowed to exercise all rights granted by the Iranian Constitution and international law." Further, the UN General Assembly voiced concern over "increasing discrimination and other human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities," and called on Iran to eliminate ethnic discrimination.

But a listener to VOA-Persian or Radio Farada would not hear a word against the regime's practices against minorities — especially against Arabs and Balochis - who have been subjected to ethnic cleansing, subject to population transfer, land confiscation and occasional aerial bombardment.

The State Department has oversight responsibility over VOA, but in this case they are clearly not exercising any influence to manage the overall message of the broadcasts. Undersecretary Karen Hughes, on behest of Secretary Rice, occupies a seat on the Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG), the main controlling body with oversight responsibility for all US Government non-military broadcasts. It is not clear if this body is aware that the overall message implied by VOA Persian language broadcast is that the US supports a strategy of re-establishing monarchy and favors keeping intact the rule of Persian minority dominance in Iran.

In a letter to VOA Director Dan Austin, representatives of Iranian Kurds, Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baloch, Lors and Turkmen argue that "on the rare occasions when someone from a minority group is invited to express an opinion on VOA-Persian TV, they have been subjected to an inquisition, on-and off-air, in which they are required to state their allegiance to the Iranian or Persian nation over their own ethnic group." Those who dare to describe themselves as Kurdish, Arab, Baloch, or simply refer to themselves as even Arab-Iranian, Balochi-Iranian, Kurdish-Iranian, etc, are not welcomed or deprived of further appearances. The existence of this discriminatory vetting process in a US government sponsored broadcast service is incredibly disturbing. One can only assume that it was allowed to continue because neither the VOA director nor the BBG were aware of what was and is going on.

Representatives of Iranian ethnic and religious minorities living in the US claim that VOA is violating its charter by its practical discrimination against non-Persian groups and has called for the dismissal of the Persian Service Director and key managers who are responsible for executing the current editorial policy. According to these representatives, VOA-Persian Service management argue that only a restored monarchy in Iran, or the current Persian-dominated theocratic regime are necessary to ensure Iran's territorial, cultural, and linguistic integrity.

Unless there is a radical shake-up in these US-funded TV and radio stations, they risk becoming a greater threat to US interests than Iran's Press TV will ever be. The millions of dollars spent on VOA and Radio Farda could be better spent on the dozens of financially poor grassroots radio and television stations run by genuine Iranian opposition groups that enjoy high ratings in their target ethnic audiences and beyond.

Ali Ghaderi is U.S. Representative of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. Karim Abdian, Ph.D., Executive Director of the Ahwaz Human Rights Organization, is U.S. Representative of the Ahwazi-Arab Ethnic Minority in Iran.

Tehran's secret war against its own people- Peter Tatchell- The Times of London

Times of London  

The Times                                                                    October 10, 2006

Peter Tatchell

The persecution of Ahwazi Arabs and the takeover of their land has led to accusations of 'ethnic cleansing'

“NEVER AGAIN” is, I fear, a phrase that we may hear again all too soon — but too late to warn people, let alone save lives. Under the cover of secrecy the fundamentalist regime in Tehran is waging a sustained, bloody campaign of intimidation and persecution against its Arab minority. These Arabs believe that they are victims of “ethnic cleansing” by Iran’s Persian majority.

Sixteen Arab rights activists have been sentenced to death, according to reports in the Iranian media. They were found guilty of insurgency in secret trials before revolutionary courts. But most of the defendants were convicted solely on the basis of confessions extracted under torture. Ten are expected to be hanged in a couple of weeks, after the end of Ramadan. Amnesty International says that two of those sentenced to die, Abdolreza Nawaseri and Nazem Bureihi, were in prison when they were alleged to have been involved in bomb attacks. Three others — Hamza Sawa- eri, Jafar Sawari and Reisan Sawari — say that they were nowhere near the Zergan oilfield the day it was bombed.

The death sentences seem designed to silence protests by Iran’s persecuted ethnic Arabs. They comprise 70 per cent of the population of the south-west province of Khuzestan, known locally as Ahwaz. Many Ahwazis believe that the 16 were framed and that their real “crime” was campaigning against Tehran’s repression and exploitation of their oil-rich homeland.

Further show trials are planned — 50 Ahwazi Arab activists have been charged with insurgency since last year. They are accused of being mohareb or enemies of God, which is a capital crime. Other allegations include sabotage and possession of home-made bombs. No material evidence has been offered to support the charges. All face possible execution.

Securing information about the impending hangings has been difficult. The authorities are notoriously secretive, often withholding information about charges, evidence and sentences. Foreign journalists are severely restricted and local reporters are intimidated with threats of imprisonment. Despite this official obfuscation, human rights groups confirm a new wave of repression against Ahwazi Arabs who accuse Tehran of “ethnic cleansing” and racism. Ali Afrawi, 17, and Mehdi Nawaseri, 20, were publicly hanged in March for allegedly participating in insurgency. Amnesty International condemned their trial as “unfair”. They were denied access to lawyers. The Ahwazi Human Rights Organisation (AHRO) says that seven other Arab political prisoners were secretly executed at around the same time.

Tehran’s latest tactic is to hold Ahwazi children as hostages. According to Amnesty International, children as young as 2 have been jailed with their mothers to force their fugitive, political-activist fathers to surrender to the police. Protests against these abuses are brutally suppressed. Ahwazi political parties, trade unions and student groups are illegal. In the past year, 25,000 Ahwazis have been arrested, 131 executed and 150 have disappeared, reports AHRO. The bodies of many of those executed have been dumped in a place that the Government calls lanat abad, the place of the damned. They are buried in shallow graves; dogs dig up and eat the bodies.

Nearly 250,000 Arabs have been displaced from their villages after the Iranian Government’s confiscation of more than 200,000 hectares of farmland for a huge sugar-cane project. Dozens more towns and villages will be erased, making a possible further 400,000 Ahwazis homeless, by the creation of a military-industrial security zone, covering more than 3,000 sq km, along the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which borders Iraq.

Ironically, the Hezbollah in Lebanon — the supposed embodiment of Arab resistance in the Middle East — is complicit in the displacement of Ahwazi Arabs. On confiscated Arab land Tehran has set up training camps for Hezbollah and for the Badr Brigades, the Iraqi fundamentalist militia. Badr death squads in Iraq are murdering Sunnis, unveiled women, gay people, men wearing shorts, barbers, sellers of alcohol and people listening to Western music.

Tehran has a grand plan to make the Ahwazi a minority in their own land through “ethnic restructuring”. Financial incentives, such as zero- interest loans, are given to ethnic Persians to settle in Ahwaz. New townships are planned, which will house 500,000 non-Arabs. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of displaced Ahwazis eke out a subsistence existence in shanty towns on the outskirts of Ahwaz city. Others have been forcibly relocated to poverty-stricken, far-flung northern regions of Iran.

Ahwaz produces 90 per cent of Iran’s oil and Tehran expropriates all the revenues. An attempt by Ahwaz MPs to secure the repatriation of 1.5 per cent of these earnings back to the region for welfare projects was rejected this year. Yet it is the third poorest region of Iran: 80 per cent of the children suffer from malnutrition, and the unemployment rate of Arabs is more than five times that of Persians.

Arab language newspapers and textbooks have been banned to crush Arab identity further. In Ahwaz schools, all instruction is in Farsi (Persian), resulting in a 30 per cent drop-out rate at primary level and 50 per cent at secondary level. Illiteracy rates among Arabs are at least four times those of non-Arabs.

Contrary to Tehran’s nationalist propaganda most Ahwazi Arabs just want a measure of self-government; they are not hellbent on independence or in league with the CIA or plotting for an American invasion. Quite the contrary, they fear that Western sabre-rattling will be used as a pretext by Tehran’s hardliners to crack down savagely on dissent. Which makes it all the more disturbing that one of the few bodies with diplomatic muscle — the Arab League, which professes pan-Arab solidarity — is so silent in the face of Iran’s persecution of Arabs

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,6-2395978,00.html

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US says Iran buys Iraq militia with arms, cash- Routers


28 September 2006
BAGHDAD, (Reuters) - Iran is funnelling weapons and cash to buy the loyalty of armed groups in Iraq, but its long- term influence is bound to wane as Iraqis focus more on their own interests, a senior US military official said.
The United States and Britain have in the past accused Iran of fostering violence in Iraq. The Islamic Republic denies it.
But the official gave far more detail, and said the latest weapons finds -- including explosives bearing factory stamps indicating they come from Iran -- show that the policy of arming Iraqi militia is supported at high levels in Iran and not the work of rogue Iranian operatives.
“You see them enabling all comers,” he said. “And by the way, nobody in this country stays bought. You’re rented.”
The senior military official was discussing intelligence issues under condition he not be named, in a briefing with journalists in Baghdad on Wednesday, the transcript of which was made available on Thursday.
He estimated that Iran has sent “millions of dollars” to the Mehdi Army militia of Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, including rogue elements that had slipped out of Sadr’s direct control.
Iranian weapons found in Iraq include surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank rockets like those used by Hezbollah in Lebanon against Israel, as well as tank-destroying Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) that have become common in roadside bombs used to attack US and British troops.
“When you talk about EFP’s, that is almost uniquely Iranian. In fact, the fingerprint of copper plate being formed in a machine shop, I mean, the pattern is so identical that, you know, we can easily identify it right there.”
Cache found
He said a cache of 4-6 EFPs were found a few months ago in Baghdad, along with C-4 military explosives bearing red labels printed in English which match factory codes from Iranian material Israel has said it has intercepted en route to Lebanon.
Similar labels have appeared on explosives found by British troops in the south of Iraq, he said.
“The control of military-grade explosives in Iran is controlled through the state apparatus and is not committed through rogue elements right there. It is a deliberate decision on the part of elements associated with the Iranian government to affect this type of activities.”
Iranians are Shias, like a majority of Iraqis, and under Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated secular rule several of the Shia religious parties that now lead Iraq’s ruling coalition were based in exile in Iran.
But the official said parties seen as pro-Iranian were already falling behind in Iraq, losing ground to groups like Sadr’s who portray themselves more as Iraqi nationalists.
“For them to function effectively inside Iraq, they have to make a decision to be Iraqi,” he said.
“Iran only has a window of opportunity to influence Iraq before Iraq -- and its natural tendencies as both an Arab state and one who’s got a whole series of friction points with the Islamic Republic -- will start to take over.”
He said Iran had fomented violence in Iraq, especially places like Basra in the south, but this could be counter productive because of mainly ethnic-Persian Iran’s own worries about unrest among its Arab and Kurdish minorities.
“It’s not in their best interest to have a destabilised Iraq, because guess what? There are Arabs in the south (of Iran) and Kurds in the north that pose significant challenges to Iranian internal stability,” he said.
“But nonetheless, they’re not sure who is going to come out on top. And so basically they fund everybody
.”

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At Home, Tehran Deals With a Restive Arab Minority- The New York Times-Michael Slackman

   
       Khuzestan is a place that illustrates the contradictions that can breed anger. The region sits atop most of the country’s oil wealth, yet its Arab residents are mostly poor. At the same time, many Arabs complain that they see their country’s wealth helping to rebuild Lebanon.


September 22, 2006
By MICHAEL SLACKMAN 

TEHRAN — “Help my young child — please help me,” cried Yabrra Banitamim, 65, in a conference room in the north of this city crowded with a dozen relatives of two men found guilty of participating in a string of deadly bombings in Iran.

The men, Malek Banitamim, 30, and Ghasem Sallamat, 42, are from Khuzestan Province, in the country’s southwest. They are Arabs in a country that is predominantly Persian and that is accused by segments of its Arab population of treating them like second-class citizens, thereby creating a separatist backlash.

Iran wants to be a leader in the Islamic world, spreading its reach and influence among Arabs and Indonesians, Sunnis and Shiites. And with its support for Hezbollahin Lebanonand its defiance of the West, it has made some progress.

But at home, Iran has often had to labor to unify its own people under one national identity, restricting the expression of ethnic variations — like languages — that it views as undermining that unity. The problem is often most apparent with its Arabs.

“There is a contradiction in Iran’s behavior toward Arab countries and toward the Arabs in the south of Iran,” said Mustafa el-Labbad, an expert in Iranian affairs who is based in Cairo.

Iran is a multiethnic nation. More than half of its 70 million people are Persian, and about 3 percent are Arabs. Other groups include the Azeris, Kurds, Turkmen, Baluchis and Lurs. Iran has recently faced strong protests from some ethnic groups, like the Azeris, with several demanding greater autonomy and cultural freedom.

In the Arab region, the authorities say, separatist groups became violent last year, setting off a string of terrorist bombs that killed or wounded many people. Mr. Banitamim and Mr. Sallamat were convicted and ordered hanged for their involvement in those attacks.

But to relatives of these men it is impossible to talk only about the crimes they were charged with. Their families see the acts of terrorism as intimately linked with the frustration and lack of hope that stems from the poverty that they say is forced on them by a majority that discriminates. This is a reality that the Iranian authorities have tried, but not succeeded, in reconciling.

“The Islamic Republic is dealing with its own terrorism problem the same way the U.S. is dealing with Al Qaeda,” said Emad Baghi, a former cleric who now heads the Tehran-based Organization for the Defense of Prisoners’ Rights.

What he meant, he said, was that both governments were using force rather than understanding.

Mr. Banitamim and Mr. Sallamat were arrested on March 11, along with 15 other men and two women. Six of that group remain under investigation, while the rest have been convicted and sentenced to death, the relatives said.

Fearful and frustrated, more than 150 family members and friends of the convicted came to Tehran to urge the authorities to lift the death sentences. Their first stop was to visit Mr. Baghi.

“The prisoners are sentenced to death because of their confessions,” said Mr. Banitamim’s older brother Yaghoub, as he opened the conversation with Mr. Baghi. “Their confessions were made under torture. They didn’t do anything.”

Mr. Baghi, who spends his days listening to the sorrows of prisoners’ families, gently asked if, indeed, the men were part of the organization that had been connected to bombings in Ahvaz, the capital of Khuzestan. “We don’t know,” the brother said, his gaze cast down.

Then, perhaps aware that Mr. Baghi already knew the answer, that the men were members of the group, he said: “They can sentence him to life in prison. We just want to stop the execution.”

Iranian officials insist that there is no discrimination against Arabs or, for that matter, any of Iran’s ethnic minorities. They note, for example, that classical Arabic is taught in schools. They point out that the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is of Azeri descent.

And they accuse Western governments of financing and helping to incite groups responsible for the violence in Ahvaz. That charge may sound self-serving, but a European diplomat in Tehran said intelligence reports from the diplomat’s home capital confirmed that there was Western support for at least one of the separatist groups.

But that has not diminished what many Iranians say is the broader need to address the social, political and cultural concerns of many ethnic groups, including Arabs. “I believe,” Mr. Baghi said, “that instead of labeling people terrorists, we should also try to understand the reason why.”

Khuzestan is a place that illustrates the contradictions that can breed anger. The region sits atop most of the country’s oil wealth, yet its Arab residents are mostly poor. At the same time, many Arabs complain that they see their country’s wealth helping to rebuild Lebanon.

The London-based pan-Arab newspaper Al Sharq al Awsat recently reported that in Khuzestan, “residents launched slogans condemning Hezbollah and the government and asked for the rebuilding of their own destroyed homes instead of interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon.”

Similar grievances could be heard from the relatives of the condemned men. “We suffered a lot because of the war with Iraq,” said Mr. Sallamat’s wife, Samira, referring to Khuzestan’s proximity to the border with Iraq. “This is not fair. We have done nothing wrong. God knows we’ve done nothing wrong.”

Mr. Baghi could do no more than advise her on a strategy. But he represented an authority figure, a bridge from the deprivation of Ahvaz to the power of Tehran. Her anger exploded. “Our problems are not only economic, they are cultural,” she complained. “They even find fault with the way we dress.” The “they” she was referring to were her Persian neighbors.

The complaints, the crying, the charges of discrimination went on around the room. A child’s eyes filled with tears every time someone mentioned that his father was to be hanged, or that his relatives could not find work because, the charge went, they were Arab.

When the relatives left, Mr. Baghi cautioned against sympathy. He said that the terrorists had taken a video of the explosions and that it had fallen into the hands of the authorities.

But it is also often much easier to make friends with strangers than to settle differences with people living under the same roof. Mr. Labbad of Egypt said that was exactly the case with Iran. When Iran addresses Arabs outside its borders, he said, it can focus on common enemies in the United States and Israel. It has no obligation beyond giving voice to feelings that already exist.

But when it comes to its own Arab population, its first responsibility is to provide life’s essentials — food, work and shelter. And that is what the families of the two condemned men tried to say, why the grievance over the sentence had become a catalyst for venting their frustrations.

“I have nine brothers and sisters, and out of all of us one brother — the brother who was arrested — was working,” said Yaghoub Banitamim. “What is the reason? Only because we are Arabs.”

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Iran: Hardline MP downplays Bassij mobilisation in Ahwaz

   

 

 

Hardline Majlis member for Ahwaz, Hamid Zanganeh, has downplayed the deployment of Bassij paramilitarist forces on the city's streets.

Local residents of the Ahwaz City, which is experiencing growing unrest from its Ahwazi Arab population, have reported a massive increase in the presence of the mullah regime's vigilante group ahead of the planned execution of 16 political prisoners. Zangeneh claimed there was no security problem, while the Bassij continue to set up check posts in the city's main roads and confiscate satellite dishes. Internet and telecommunications have also been disrupted. The regime appears to be preparing for a complete media blackout, ahead of a clamp-down on protests.

In March, public executions of young Ahwazi Arabs accused of insurgency led to violent rioting. Ahwazi groups expect a new round of executions either this week or after Eid-ul-Fitr (expected around 24 October), which marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan (no executions are permitted during Ramadan). Controversy has surrounded the convictions of the 16 men, with one of Iran's leading human rights activists, Emadeddin Baghi, claiming a "grave injustice" had been carried out by the courts (
click here for more information). The lawyers for the accused have also protested at the unfair convictions and staged a walk-out during the trials.

Zanganeh has lobbied the government to convict and execute anyone and everyone deemed a "threat to national security", including cultural rights activists. He claimed that failure to take a hard line to quash Ahwazi Arab dissent would be a sign of weakness. The imminent executions are widely believed to have been prompted by Zanganeh's high-profile efforts to persuade the government to kill off all signs of Ahwazi Arab opposition to the
regime, including peaceful dissent

http://www.ahwaz.org.uk/2006/09/iran-hardline-mp-downplays-bassij.html

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"27 Ahwazi dissidents in custody"

 

 Emadeddin Baghi 


According to BBC Persian Service, one of Iran's leading human rights activists, Emadeddin Baghi, the head of the the Society for Defending Prisoners' Rights and editor of the banned Jumhuriyat (Republic) newspaper, has identified 27 Ahwazi Arab political prisoners in custody, including 18 alleged members of the Kataeb party. They are among 146 dissidents being held by the regime, which also include 50 members of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and five members of the Kurdish Komala party.

The regime does not recognise dissidents in its custody as political prisoners and therefore does not publish statistics. This makes it difficult to assess the true number of prisoners of conscience held by the regime. Most are accused by the regime of posing a threat to national security. Baghi himself received a three-prison sentence in 2000 for "attacking national security" and "disseminating false news." He was released in February 2003, but his passport has still not been returned to him.

Baghi wrote an appeal in June in relation to death sentences issued to Ahwazis who the regime claims were "waging war on God". He wrote: "Discussions with the families and lawyers of those sentenced have convinced me that the court decision made about the fate of these individuals requires your close attention in order to prevent the possibility of grave injustice."

He called on the authorities to reduce the sentences, allow the accused to meet with their lawyers and added that "the possibility of defendants admitting to uncommitted crimes under duress is not unheard of and in this case of particular national sensitivity all possibilities must be investigated in order to avoid costly mistakes not only in relation to the taking of precious human lives but also because of the real potential for heightening and injuring ethnic sensibilities."

Click here for Mr Baghi's letter to Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, Chief of the Judiciary

http://www.ahwaz.org.uk/news.html

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UNHCR deeply concerned about Ahwazi refugees in Syria


Saturday, September 16, 2006


Press release from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees:

UNHCR is deeply concerned about the fate of three Ahwazi refugees (Iranian Arabs) in Syria. The three men were arrested by Syrian authorities last May in Damascus and have been detained since that time. Prior to their detention, they had been recognized as refugees by UNHCR under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and have been accepted for resettlement in Western European countries.

We have been in regular contact with Syrian authorities in Damascus as well as in Geneva to discuss the situation of the three men. Our staff have been promised several times that they be able to meet with the three detainees, but so far we have had no access despite numerous requests.

We are appealing for the immediate release of the three Ahwazi. We are also calling on the Syrian authorities to refrain from extraditing the three refugees to Iran, and instead to allow their departure to their countries of resttlement.

Deportation of recognized refugees represents a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. This principle of customary international law prohibits states from returning a refugee or asylum seeker to territories where there is a risk that his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. It is also embodied in Article 3 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Syria is a party

We are all the more concerned about these three detained refugees following Syria's previous extradition to Iran of an Arab-Iranian Ahwazi last May. This refugee had been recognized under UNHCR's mandate at the end of 2005 and had been accepted for resettlement to a third country. Nevertheless, he was arrested in March and detained by the Syrian authorities until his extradition to Iran, where he is reportedly detained.

Ahwazi refugees arrived from Iran in Syria and Iraq at various times, most recently in 2005 following a confrontation between members of the Ahwazi community and government forces in the Ahwaz region.

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Fear of imminent execution

 

 

  

PUBLIC                                                                                                          AI Index: MDE 13/100/2006

    

                                                                                                                                 12 September 2006

 

Further Information on UA 283/05 (MDE 13/052/2005, 1 November 2005) and follow-up (MDE 13/073/2005, 25 November 2005) - Fear of imminent execution

 

IRAN                                                 Shahla Jahed (f), aged 36


 

Shahla Jahed is once againfacing imminent execution, after the Supreme Court reportedly upheld her death sentence for the second time. She was sentenced to death for murdering her husband’s first wife in 2002. She may have been coerced into confessing to the murder.  

 

Shahla Jahed, a "temporary" wife of Nasser Mohammad-Khani, a former striker for the Iranian national football team and former manager of a team in Tehran, stands accused of stabbing to death Laleh Saharkhizan, her husband’s “permanent” wife, on 9 October 2002. She was initially sentenced to death in June 2004 and an appeal by her relatives, at the time, was rejected and the judges of Branch 15 of the Supreme Court upheld the sentence. Shahla Jahed’s lawyer reportedly wrote a letter to the Head of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, requesting a review of the execution order in view of the fact that Shahla Jahed's case had not been properly investigated. In November 2005 the Head of the Judiciary reportedly ordered a stay of execution so that the case could be re-examined.

 

On 11 September 2006, the judges of Branch Seven of the Supreme Court reportedly upheld Shahla Jahed’s death sentence by a majority vote. Her lawyer reportedly confirmed that the Supreme Court's rulinghad been written and endorsed and that both Shahla Jahed and the family of Laleh Saharkhizan would be formally informed of the decision on 13 September.

 

Shahla Jahed was said to have confessed to the murder of Laleh Saharkhizan during the initial investigation, but during her trial consistently upheld her innocence. In December 2004, on being told of a previous Supreme Court ruling in the case, Shahla Jahed reportedly said, “Everyone knows the conditions under which I confessed.”

 

The prosecution reportedly claimed that Shahla Jahed had murdered Laleh Saharkhizan out of jealousy. Nasser Mohammad-Khani was himself initially suspected of complicity in the murder and jailed for some months, but was reportedly released. 

 

Amnesty International is concerned that Shahla Jahed’s confession may have been made under duress. 

 

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Under Iranian law, men and women can have both "permanent" and "temporary" marriages. In a temporary marriage, men and women can commit to be married for a certain period of time, after which the marriage is null and void.

 

Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all cases as the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The organization has recorded 108 executions in Iran so far this year, including those of two women, although the true figure may be much higher.

 

 

 

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Please send appeals to arrive as quickly as possible, in, Persian, Arabic, English or your own language:

- acknowledging that governments have a responsibility to bring to justice those suspected of criminal offences, but stating your unconditional opposition to the death penalty, as the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and violation of the right to life;

- urging the authorities to stop the execution of Shahla Jahed and to commute her death sentence immediately;

- asking for details of her trial, her appeal and her legal representation;

- expressing concern that Shahla Jahed’s confession may have been coerced, and calling for an investigation into the circumstances in which it was made, the methods and findings of which should be  made public, and anyone found to be responsible for abuses should be brought to justice;

- reminding the authorities that confessions extracted under duress are prohibited by Article 38 of the Constitution of Iran, which says that “All forms of torture for the purpose of extracting confession or acquiring information are forbidden,” and that Iran is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), or which Article 7 states that “No one shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment”.

 

APPEALS TO:

Leader of the Islamic Republic

His Excellency Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khameni

The Office of the Supreme Leader, Shoahada Street, Qom, Islamic Republic of Iran

Fax:                 + 98 251 774 2228 (mark "FAO the office of His Excellency, Ayatollah al Udhma Khameni’’)

Email:              Info@leader.ir

istiftaa@wilayah.org

Salutation:       Your Excellency

 

Head of the Judiciary

His Excellency Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi

Ministry of Justice, Park-e Shahr, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran

Email:              Please send emailsviathe feedback form on the Persian site of the website

http://www.iranjudiciary.org/contactus-feedback-fa.html

                                    The text of the feedback form translates as:

1st Iine: name, 2nd line: email address, 3rd line: subject heading

                        then enter your email into the text box

Salutation:       Your Excellency

 

COPIES TO:

President

His Excellency Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

The Presidency, Palestine Avenue,

Azerbaijan Intersection, Tehran,

 Islamic Republic of Iran

Email:              dr-ahmadinejad@president.ir OR via website: www.president.ir/email

 

Speaker of Parliament

His Excellency Gholamali Haddad Adel

Majles-e Shoura-ye Eslami, Imam Khomeini Avenue, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran

Fax:              + 98 21 6 646 1746

 

and to diplomatic representatives of Iran accredited to your country.

 

PLEASE SEND APPEALS IMMEDIATELY. Check with the International Secretariat, or your section office, if

sending appeals after 24 October 2006.

 

 

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New concerns: Fear of imminent execution/ medical concern

 

 

PUBLIC                                                                                                          AI Index: MDE 13/102/2006        

                                                                                                                                 14 September 2006

 

Further Information on UA 21/05 (MDE 13/003/2005, 25 January 2005) Death penalty/Unfair trial New concerns: Fear of imminent execution/ medical concern

 

IRAN                                                 Khaled Hardani (m)


 

Khaled Hardani is reported to be at risk of imminent execution. He was sentenced to death for his part in the January 2001 attempted hijacking of a 30-seater passenger aircraft.

 

On 6 September 2006, Khaled Hardani's father-in-law and wife met the Head of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Shahroudi, and the judge who presided at Khaled Hardani's trial.On hearing that Khaled Hardani had not yet been executed, the judge is reported to have said, “Has it not been carried out? We confirmed it and sent it for implementation”. Ayatollah Shahroudi told them that he was unable to grant an amnesty in this case as his crime of hijacking was too serious. His family members were given a letter, which was read out to them, confirming his death sentence, although no date was set for his execution. They were told to take it to the Office for Implementation of Sentences, which they did on 9 September. Press reports have suggested that Khaled Hardani may be executed in the Iranian month of Aban, which begins on 23 October.

 

Khaled Hardani was originally scheduled to hang on 19 January 2005, but the Head of the Judiciary ordered a stay of execution the previous day, apparently to allow lawyers to appeal. In May 2006 Khaled Hardani, who is currently held in Evin Prison in Tehran, told Amnesty International from prison that following the stay of execution, his case and that of his brothers-in-law had been referred to the Board of Monitoring and Follow-up (Heyat-e Nezarat va Peigiri), which had failed to issue any decision. He said he had been left not knowing his fate: "The death sentence is there. It has not been removed and at any time they decide, they can call me and say that your sentence must be carried out today or tomorrow or in the next hour… The only thing that is in my file is the order from [Head of the Judiciary] Shahroudi to stop the execution. But for how long it is going to be effective, is not clear. It is possible that they could call me in the next hour and say that your sentence has been confirmed and you must be executed tomorrow morning."He added that neither he nor his lawyer had ever received any documents concerning the confirmation of his death sentence by the Supreme Court. He said, "For six years the Islamic Republic has kept me, together with my two brothers-in-law, under the sentence of death and have also sentenced a brother of mine to 22 years’ imprisonment. In addition, my wife, my small child and a number of my other relatives have been kept in jail for some time... Have you ever experienced receiving a death sentence? Have your partner, parents, brother, sister and relatives been told that tonight a close relative of yours is going to be executed? Can you understand the horror and shock of hearing such news? Have you even imagined that? But me, two of my close relatives and our families have been going through this – not for a night or two or few nights, but for a period of over two thousand nights." Khaled Hardani also complained that he was not getting adequate medical treatment for injuries to his face sustained when he was shot during the attempted hijacking, and that he had been denied visits from his family forthree months.

 

Khaled Hardani announced that he was going on hunger strike on 20 May 2006 to protest at his ongoing detention and the uncertainty surrounding his fate. He is believed to have stopped his hunger strike shortly afterwards. Khaled Hardani’s two sons, aged 7 and 5, are both reportedly suffering distress at their father’s situation. His elder son, who is refusing to go to school, is apparently receiving medical treatment as a result of this distress.

 

Khaled Hardani was one of 11 members of an extended family who attempted to commandeer a scheduled flight between the southern Iranian cities of Ahvaz and Bandar Abbas, and force it to fly to Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. Security guards already on board ended the hijack attempt while the plane was still on the runway at Ahvaz, reportedly shooting Khaled Hardani in the process. The family were reportedly trying to escape the poverty and hopelessness they were experiencing as members of Iran's Arab minority. Khaled Hardani was sentenced to death, together with his brothers-in-law, Shahram and Farhang Pourmansouri, on charges of "acts against national security" (eqdam ‘aleyhe amniyat) and Moharebeh, or "enmity with God", rather than charges relating specifically to hijacking an aircraft. At the time of the hijacking, the brothers were reportedly aged 17 and 18 respectively. As a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights (ICCPR), Iran has undertaken not to execute anyone for an offence committed when they were under the age of 18. The Head of the Judiciary reportedly ordered the executions of all three men to be stayed because of the ages of the two brothers. It is not clear if the confirmation of Khaled Hardani’s death sentence also applies to the Pourmansouri brothers.

 

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Please send appeals to arrive as quickly as possible, in Farsi, Arabic, English, French or your own language:

-urging the authorities to commute immediately the death sentences against Khaled Hardani and his brothers-in-law, Shahram and Farhang Pourmansouri;

- acknowledging that governments have a responsibility to bring to justice those suspected of criminal offences such as murder, but stating your unconditional opposition to the death penalty, as the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and violation of the right to life;

- expressing concern that Shahram, aged 17 at the time of his offence, is facing execution;

- reminding the authorities that they are a state party to the ICCPR, which states that the "sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age";

- pointing out that the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child called on Iran in January 2005 to "immediately suspend the execution of all death penalties imposed on persons for having committed a crime before the age of 18, and to abolish the death penalty as a sentence imposed on persons for having committed crimes before the age of 18, as required by article 37 of the Convention [on the Rights of the Child]";

- asking for details of the trial of Khaled Hardani and his brothers-in-law, Shahram and Farhang Pourmansouri, and any appeals they may have made;

- urging the authorities to ensure that Khaled Hardani and his brothers-in-law receive any necessary medical treatment.

 

APPEALS TO:

Leader of the Islamic Republic

His Excellency Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khameni

The Office of the Supreme Leader, Shoahada Street, Qom, Islamic Republic of Iran

Fax: + 98 251 774 2228 (mark "FAO the office of His Excellency, Ayatollah al Udhma Khameni’’)

Email: Info@leader.ir OR istiftaa@wilayah.org

Salutation: Your Excellency

 

Head of the Judiciary

His Excellency Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi

Ministry of Justice, Park-e Shahr, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran

Email: Please send emails via the feedback form on the Persian site of the website http://www.iranjudiciary.org/contactus-feedback-fa.html

The text of the feedback form translates as: 1st Iine: name, 2nd line: email address, 3rd line: subject heading; then enter your email into the text box

Salutation: Your Excellency

 

COPIES TO:

Speaker of Parliament

His Excellency Gholamali Haddad Adel

Majles-e Shoura-ye Eslami, Imam Khomeini Avenue, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran

Fax: + 98 21 6 646 1746

 

and to diplomatic representatives of Iran accredited to your country.

PLEASE SEND APPEALS IMMEDIATELY. Check with the International Secretariat, or your section office, if sending appeals after 26 October 2006.

 

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